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ABSTRACT 
The introduction of the European global navigation satellite system GALILEO allows also 
for a modernization of automatic train control technology. This is advisable because of the 
still enormous amount of collisions between trains or other kinds of obstacles (construction 
vehicles, construction workers, pedestrians), even if comprehensive and complex 
technology is extensively deployed in the infrastructure which should help to avoid such 
collisions. Experiences from the aeronautical Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) as well as the maritime Automatic Identification System (AIS) have shown that the 
probability of collisions can be significantly reduced with collision avoidance support 
systems, which do hardly require infrastructure components. In this article, we introduce 
our “RCAS” approach consisting only of mobile ad-hoc components, i.e. without the 
necessity of extensions of the railway infrastructure. Each train determines its position, 
direction and speed using GALILEO and broadcasts this information, complemented with 
other important information such as dangerous goods classifications in the region of its 
current location. This information can be received and evaluated by other trains, which 
may – if a potential collision is detected – lead to traffic alerts and resolution advisories up 
to direct interventions (usually applying the brakes). 
 
STATE OF THE ART IN TRAIN CONTROL  
Today the safety of railway operation is mainly ensured by the interlocking which sets and 
locks the train route. All track elements are set and locked in the correct position, before 
signals are set to green. The trains are equipped with the onboard part of the train control 
system which triggers automatically a braking if the train passes a signal at danger. The 
safety of railway operation depends on the correct operation of the interlocking and the 
train control system. Human errors [2] lead to most of the accidents [6]. Nevertheless the 
safety technology has some important drawbacks:  
• Trains which are not equipped with onboard train control systems may pass signals 
without problems. Typical trains of this kind are construction trains, foreign trains or 
groups of wagons.  
• A malfunction in the railway control centre or in the onboard safety system can 
prevent monitoring entirely. 
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• Major parts of the European railway network are not equipped with railway control 
and signalling technology due to the low traffic density in these areas. Trains which 
never leave these areas or most often neither equipped with train control systems. 
• Deployment of signalling infrastructure is expensive and inflexible. The position of the 
signals, together with the train safety components which initiate the brakes in case of 
a signal passed at danger is fixed. Temporal deployment of signalling infrastructure is 
rarely done because of the efforts. 
Due to this reasons rail vehicles collide with each other (Trains, work trains, road rail 
vehicles, etc.). Another typical type of accident is collisions with road vehicles or persons 
on level crossings. The reason is either a malfunction of the control system or 
misbehaviour of the person or driver, e.g. a driver of a car drives around closed half 
barriers.  
STATE OF THE RESEARCH IN TRAIN CONTROL AND RAILWAY 
SATELLITE POSITIONING 
A remarkable number of research projects have been performed in the field of satellite 
positioning used for train control [4][10][13] which can be used as input for RCAS. In the 
project RUNE (Rail User Navigation Equipment) funded by the European Space Agency 
(ESA) has a suitable set of equipment been developed. It has been demonstrated that a 
satellite based system can be used to localise a train.   
The project LOCOPROL (Low Cost satellite based train location system for signalling and 
train protection for low density lines – see http://www.locoprol.org) has been funded by the 
European Commission. This project used US GPS (Global Positioning System) and its 
Russian pendant GLONASS as well as EGNOS (European GNSS Overlay System) to 
reach a safe positioning of trains. LOCOPROL and RUNE like some others base on the 
idea to capture a position on the train and to transmit it to a trackside system. RCAS uses 
the basic proof-of-technology which has been given in the mentioned projects, but 
integrates it in a different application. The communication concept does not use the path 
via the infrastructure. The trains are informing each other directly about their position and 
other parameters as will be described in the following sections. 
The GALILEO programme is Europe’s initiative to develop a civil global navigation satellite 
system that provides highly accurate and reliable positioning, navigation and timing 
services. GALILEO will provide instantaneous positioning services at the metre level as a 
result of improved orbits, better clocks, dual frequency and enhanced navigation 
algorithms as well as integrity information. For safety of life applications, local elements 
can be integrated to provide more accurate positioning, communication and/or information 
services. For example, GALILEO Local Elements will be developed and adapted to meet 
specific requirements in rail transportation. 
APPROACH 
The basic idea of the Railway Collision Avoidance System (RCAS) is – similar to the 
airborne TCAS/ADS-B [1] and the maritime AIS [8,12] – to broadcast information about 
position, movement vector and others form the moving units as well as from specific 
infrastructure elements. Basically the trains and rail vehicles determine their position and 
movement vector and broadcast this information to all other trains in the area which is only 
limited by the range of the RCAS-sender. Each moving unit on the rails like regular trains, 
work trains, road rail vehicles, etc. can be equipped with RCAS. The RCAS-units receive 
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all broadcasted information and compare position and movement vector with the own one 
to detect possible collisions. Fig. 1 shows the basic interaction of the RCAS components.  
EBULA 
Alert! 
 Fig. 1: Interaction of the components of RCAS 
Two major aspects are different form TCAS/ADS-B and the maritime AIS: the mechanical 
guidance by the rails reduces the options for possible reactions of the driver: The driver 
can brake the train in one dimension1. The set and lock of train route is done by the 
signaller and so he has to get the information about possible collisions, too.  
Another differing aspect is that movement vectors of rail vehicles may pass extremely 
close or even point to each other e. g. two trainsets performing a joining procedure or 
banking are two kinds of “allowed collisions”. Overhauling while in motion and passing of 
trains is allowed as well as two high speed trains passing each other with a relative speed 
difference of 600 km/h at 4 m lateral distance. Because of the extremely deterministic 
movement behaviour of rail vehicles are all these situations can be identified and 
classified, so that RCAS can send a warning to the driver or the signaller. If a collision 
cannot be avoided any more the driver can start braking end – at least – reduce the 
consequences of the collision. Other resolution possibilities can be chosen by the signaller 
in the interlocking, which will be discussed later in section 0.  
The position can be determined in particular using the global satellite navigation system 
GALILEO [7], which can be extended by local elements to ensure coverage in areas 
without direct satellite visibility (e.g. in tunnels). The accuracy can be further improved by 
using a differential overlay-system (typically down to cm). A precision on the cm level is for 
instance required for a reliable track determination. While passing trackside installed 
Balises2, another source of data for the identification of the current track is available which 
can be used to increase the safety level.  
                                                          
1 This dimension follows the track and is so no Cartesian co-ordinate. 
2 A Balise is a passive transponder which is activated during the passing of the train and sends a telegram to the receiver on board of 
the train [9]. Two types are in use: Fix data Balises, which transmits one predefined telegram and transparent or switchable Balises, 
which can be connected to a signal source and transmit different telegrams according to the incoming signal. Balises are used to 
transmit topological location references.  
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The main challenge of RCAS is the evaluation of the trajectories of the vehicles. It is quite 
normal that the movement vectors of trains are direct in opposite (e.g. coupling) 
respectively almost in opposite (e.g. passing trains on parallel tracks). This is a distinctive 
factor compared to TCAS/ADS-B, where the air traffic control has the responsibility to 
separate aircrafts in three dimensions. 
Track identification of the traffic in the vicinity of a train is done within the RCAS receiver 
by matching the precise positioning information transmitted by the RCAS senders on a 
track map. Some topological information like a list of expected Balises are available on 
trains which are equipped with ETCS3. The correctness of the matched tracks can be 
verified by further evaluating the track IDs as long as these are contained in the messages 
of the RCAS senders (cf. Figure 5). 
Beside information about the current position and the speed of a train, an RCAS sender 
also transmits information about the track in front of the train (topological route). If the train 
is equipped with an electronic timetable (e.g. the German Ebula) it knows the entire route 
in non-safe information. The safe route for the next 5 to 50 km is known at the interlocking 
and can be sent to the train. If the RCAS receiver of another train has access to the 
topological vector of the train, it can determine the probability of a conflict by vector 
superpositioning. If the safe route and the position determined by map matching are not 
identical, this is already a first indication for a potential conflict and can cause an alert to 
be transmitted via RCAS to the trains in the vicinity. 
RCAS works also without digital trackmaps. In this case the determination of conflicts 
becomes less reliable with the distance and the relative speed between two trains. This 
can partially compensated with further sensors. For instance, an inertial platform 
(gyroscope) integrated into RCAS can be used to determine the cross acceleration which 
than can be used to estimate curves in the track. Obviously this may help on tracks with 
lots of curves (e.g. in an alpine region) but does not allow for improved estimates on 
straight tracks. Digital maps allow for a track-lane selective, i.e. left-right distinguished 
estimate and thus a much more precise detection of potential collisions, respectively out-
of-gauge load conflicts. 
 
APPLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES AND 
CONCEPTS 
In this section are some examples of implementations discussed with some details. The 
basic system is invariant, the different application variants. 
COLLISION AND FLANK PROTECTION   
The basic concept is the collision detection of two trains: both trains determine their 
position and movement vector using GNSS. This information is transmitted together with 
some other information like type of mission and train number by mobile radio to the trains 
in the area around.  
                                                          
3 The new European Train Control System (ETCS) in the European Rail Transport Management System (ERTMS) is the basis for the 
technical interoperability in Europe. 
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Fig. 2: Collision detection with RCAS 
Each receiver compares his own position and vector with all received vectors. As soon as 
a collision in the four-dimensional space (time and three space dimensions) has been 
identified a specific reaction is triggered. Depending of the parameters like remaining 
distance, time to collision and the speed the reaction is selected beginning from different 
types of warning up to an automatic braking.  
TRACK WORK PROTECTION  
Track work protection can be performed in several aspects by RCAS: the construction 
track itself can be transmitted as blocked track and – using the same telegram – the 
neighbouring track can be transmitted as area with reduced allowed speed. In the opposite 
direction the working gang can be warned against an approaching train.  
LEVEL CROSSINGS (LX) 
A significant number of collisions are happening with road vehicles on level crossings with 
half-barriers. One application of RCAS is the supervision of the danger zone of the level 
crossing with magnetic detection, RADAR, Video or similar technologies. Instead of the 
movement vector is he occupation status of the danger zone the criterion which is 
transmitted.  
• LX secured and danger zone free => proceed 
• LX secured and danger zone occupied by moving object => Warning 
• LX secured and standing object in the danger zone => Danger 
• LX not correctly secured 
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The application of RCAS for level crossings uses the detected status of the road vehicle 
passing the rails and informs the driver of the train. The detected and transmitted obstacle 
information triggers a warning or removers the warning if the road vehicle leaves the 
danger zone.  
TRANSPORT WITH OUT-OF-GAUGE LOAD 
Another application of RCAS is the warning of advancing trains against trains with out-of-
gauge load. Four classes of out-of-gauge load can be defined in difference to normal 
clearance gauge trains: 
N
A
B C D
Out-of-gauge load classes 
 
Fig. 3: Out-of-gauge classes  
N: Normal clearance gauge 
A: out-of-gauge load without influence to neighbour tracks, out-of-gauge vertically. 
B: out-of-gauge load which can pass normal clearance gauge trains and out-of-gauge class A or B. 
Cannot pass train with class C or D. 
C: out-of-gauge load which can pass normal clearance gauge trains (N). Cannot pass trains with out-of-
gauge load.  
D: Cannot pass other trains. Interlocking of neighbouring tracks required.  
 
  
N N
A 
B N
B B
B
A
C N
C
A
D
N 
B 
A 
A 
A 
Fig. 4: Compatibility table 
A train with a RCAS-sender can transmit in the broadcasted telegram an out-of-gauge 
warning and the related class. Normally no reaction should be needed, because the out-of-
gauge trains require a specific time table and route preparation. RCAS can be used to 
increase the safety of out-of-gauge transports.  
FREIGHT SUPERVISION   
Different types of dangerous goods are transported by the railways, e.g. chemicals, 
explosives, radioactive material, carburant. Some of these goods together can intensify the 
danger in case of an accident, e.g. by reaction. In [11] is a system discussed which 
identifies these situations by the use of Shortrange-RF-Controllers and knowledge based 
rulebase. RCAS goes a step further and transmits the dangerous goods identifier. Trains 
with another “incompatible” freight can be warned early.  
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PERMISSIVE OBSTACLES  
RCAS can transmit warnings against “hard” obstacles like advancing trains as well as 
“permissive” obstacles like small flooding or avalanches. In this case the reaction of the 
trains must not be an emergency stop; the train has to reduce the speed and continues. 
The detection of these “permissive” obstacles can be done be automatically by a sensing 
system or manually by drivers of previous trains. Areas which are known for their risk of 
floodings or avalanches can be equipped with a number of RCAS devices.  
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT  
The integration of the RCAS communication network in the railway control center some 
more options are possible to resolve detected collisions. Train paths can be modified or 
signals set to stop by the train dispatcher [3]. These reactions at the infrastructure side 
increase the number of possible reactions.  
 
 
REALISATION APPROACH  
LOCALISATION TECHNOLOGY 
The basic localisation technology is a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) like the 
European GALILEO or the US GPS (Global Positioning System). This system delivers in 
fixed time steps with 1 Hz or 10 Hz or even more information about the current 
geographical position. Using a digital map this geographical position is transformed into a 
topological position. By using two or more topological positions the speed and movement 
vector of the train can be calculated. Along-track Balises are queried where available to 
further identify discrete positions along the track. Any other available positioning 
technology may be integrated.  
TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGIES  
RCAS requires a robust and fast, ad-hoc inter-vehicle communication procedure. In 
principle, any type of wireless communication procedure with supports concurrent access 
to the shared resource “frequency” can be adopted, including TDMA, CDMA, OFDM or 
MC-CDMA [5]. Optional, synchronisation on the medium access layer can be done using 
GALILEO, e.g. by calculating TDMA timeslots from the current geographic position of an 
RCAS sender. Alternatively the slots can be calculated from the train ID or the RCAS-ID 
using a hash function. 
Because of the geographic disjunction eventually the frequencies allocated for the 
maritime AIS can be reused for RCAS. Another option is to share the frequency band with 
other vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems, such as the one developed in the 
Car2Car Communications Consortium4. 
RCAS senders periodically transmit telegrams describing the status of vehicles (e.g. train) 
or obstacles (e.g. construction team on track) coupled to them.  
 
 
                                                          
4 http://www.car-2-car.org 
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 Fig. 5: Sample structure of a RCAS telegram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE  
This contribution discusses an approach for a trainborne system to avoid collisions called 
railway Collision Avoidance System (RCAS). This system is located completely on board 
of the rail vehicles and uses basically the information about position, speed and direction 
determined by a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and a regional broadcast of this 
and further information with mobile radio.  
 
The implementation of this idea just started. A working consisting of DLR and external 
partners is on the way to define the details of a future implementation. The next step will 
be the realisation of a prototype to show the feasibility if the approach.  
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